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Curran: The Military Trial at Rennes

THE MILITARY TRIAL AT RENNES:
TEXT AND SUBTEXT OF THE DREYFUS AFFAIR
Vivian Grosswald Curran*
The Dreyfus affair, known throughout France simply as “the
affair” (“l’affaire”), caused the downfall of multiple Ministers of
War, of an administration, and led France to the brink of civil war, as
well as to a failed coup d’état.1
The military trial at Rennes, namely Dreyfus’s second military trial, which will be the central focus of this essay, was a culminating point of l’affaire. It was the last opportunity for the military
system of justice to redeem itself. This was because of the incontrovertible evidence of Dreyfus’s innocence that existed by the time of
the second trial.2 The guilt of the true traitor, Esterhazy, had been established through a sample of his handwriting, widely disseminated
in the press, juxtaposed with a facsimile of the bordereau (the treasonous piece of writing by a spy for Germany that had constituted the
basis of Dreyfus’s arrest and conviction), which also was in Esterhazy’s handwriting.3 A document concocted by Colonel Henry, on
behalf of the army, that had been used in order to ensure that Dreyfus
*

Distinguished Faculty Scholar, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. My sincerest
thanks to Professor Rodger Citron and Dean Linda Howard Weissman of Touro College
Law Center for inviting me to address the panel on Dreyfus and the military tribunals from
which this paper emerged, and for having organized a uniquely valuable and pleasurable intellectual experience. My thanks also to my co-panelists, General André Bach and Professor
David Cole, as well as to Professors Michael Marrus and Gary Shaw, who introduced and
moderated the panel on military tribunals.
1
See generally JEAN-DENIS BREDIN, THE AFFAIR: THE CASE OF ALFRED DREYFUS (Jeffrey
Mehlman trans., George Braziller, Inc. 1986) (1983) (discussing “l’affaire”); RUTH HARRIS,
DREYFUS: POLITICS, EMOTION, AND THE SCANDAL OF THE CENTURY 469-76 (Henry Holt &
Co., LLC 2010) (2010) (including an excellent chronology of the events of “l’affaire”);
Jean-Max Guieu, Chronology of the Dreyfus Affair, GEORGETOWN UNIV. (May 2000),
http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/guieuj/DreyfusCase/Chronology%20of%20the%20Dre
yfus%20Affair.htm (including a simple, yet comprehensive, chronology of the events of
“l’affaire”).
2
Guieu, supra note 1.
3
BREDIN, supra note 1, at 224-25.
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would be convicted later had been revealed to be a forgery.4 By the
time of the second trial, it also was known that the army had supplied
a file to the military judges secretly during the course of the first trial,
without divulging its contents to the defense, in violation of the law.5
Still other relevant exculpatory information had been disseminated in
the pro-Dreyfus press.6 The Rennes military trial began with a reading to the court of the report drafted by the Court of Cassation,
France’s supreme court for criminal matters, which had decided to
remand the Dreyfus conviction for a second military trial by the
Council of War (le Conseil de Guerre).7 The Court of Cassation’s
report was thorough and specific, setting forth the many irregularities
of the first trial and the grounds for Dreyfus to be innocent.8
What, then, was the result of Dreyfus’s second trial? He was
convicted again, although this time with “attenuating circumstances,”
and for only ten years.9 A shift had taken place in the dynamic of interaction between the public and the trial with the second Council of
War. Firstly, the verdict itself would no longer be unanimous, despite the fact that, just as last time, all of the judges were in the military.10 Two out of the seven judges would vote to acquit.11 Secondly, the sentence voted by the remaining five would not be carried
out.12 Indeed, immediately after the verdict, the military court unanimously asked the government that Dreyfus not be subjected to
military degradation.13 In this paradoxical gesture by the Rennes tribunal, that just had voted to convict Dreyfus, Jean-Denis Bredin sees
the first step towards the eventual, and highly controversial, presiden4

Id. at 225.
Guieu, supra note 1.
6
BREDIN, supra note 1, at 221-22 (explaining that the press had said so much that it was
clear that charges would be dropped).
7
1 LE PROCÉS DREYFUS: DEVANT LE CONSEIL DE GUERRE DE RENNES (7 AOUT – 9 SEPT.
1899) 2-7 (P.-V Stock ed., 1900).
8
Id.; see also Guieu, supra note 1 (outlining what led to the Court of Cassation’s decision
and its effect).
9
See, e.g., BREDIN, supra note 1, at 427-28 (describing the sentencing); HARRIS, supra
note 1, at 474 (describing the guilty verdict); Guieu, supra note 1 (stating that Dreyfus was
found guilty once again).
10
See BREDIN, supra note 1, at 517, 542-43 (recounting the 5-2 decision).
11
Id.
12
Id. at 545.
13
Id. After his initial conviction, Dreyfus had been degraded and sent to Devil’s Island in
perpetuity. HARRIS, supra note 1, at 470. With the reopening of his trial, his rank had been
restored, which meant that with his subsequent re-conviction; he once again should have
been subjected to the same degradation.
5
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tial pardon of Dreyfus.14 Although the pardon left much to be desired, even that was not the final chapter in the affaire. In 1906 Dreyfus finally was fully vindicated when he won a Supreme Court reversal (“cassation”) of the Rennes conviction, and this time it was to be
without remand (“renvoi”).15
This conclusion was procedurally exceptional for the French
Supreme Court of criminal law, for it meant that the Court of Cassation had decided not only to void the lower court’s decision, but also
that nothing subsisted which could be “qualified as a crime or a misdemeanor.”16 The latter step generally was not undertaken by the
court which, as its name made clear, habitually quashed (“cassait”)
lower court decisions, but left them to be substantively retried in further, de novo proceedings.17 In Professor Bell’s words, “The normal
cassation procedure is that the Cour de cassation merely decides the
disputed question of law and then refers it to a different cour d’appel
[court of appeals] for a decision on the merits in the light of its ruling.”18 Thus, the Cour de cassation “is not strictly an appeal court,
but merely a body that quashes the rulings of appeal courts for error
of law.”19
The first military tribunal had been able to insist that no hearings be conducted publicly.20 At Rennes, the second military tribunal
held all hearings publicly, except for one, and the fact that the court
insisted on holding any at all behind closed doors both exacerbated
criticism of the proceedings and was hotly contested by the defense,
for this time the eyes of the country and of the world were fixed on
14

BREDIN, supra note 1, at 545.
Id. at 547.
16
Id.
17
JOHN BELL, FRENCH LEGAL CULTURES 29 (Lexis Law Publ’g 2001) (2001). Unlike in
the United States, on such remands, courts are not bound to follow the Court of Cassation’s
reasoning. See Hervé Rigoli, INSTITUTIONS JUDICIARIES 121 (3d ed. 2001). Only in recent
years did the law change to oblige lower courts to conform to Supreme Court rulings on a
second remand. Today, after a first remand, where a second lower court echoes the first one,
disagreeing with the Supreme Court, the Court of Cassation will rehear the case in plenary
session on appeal, after which a lower court on remand must follow its instructions. In
Dreyfus’s time, even that much was not required.
18
BELL, supra note 17.
19
Id.
20
Steven Lubet, Why the Dreyfus Affair Does and Doesn’t Matter, 13 GREEN BAG 2d 329,
331 (2010) (reviewing LOUIS BEGLEY, WHY THE DREYFUS AFFAIR MATTERS (Yale Univ.
Press 2009) (“Dreyfus’s attorney asked that the hearing be opened to the public, expecting to
expose the transparent weakness of the prosecution case, but the military judges denied the
request.”)).
15
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Rennes.21 The world press was ready to convict France if France
convicted Dreyfus. And France itself, author of the Rights of Man
and Citizens,22 country of the philosophes, and of the Enlightenment,
was only too painfully aware of this.23 After the verdict, not only did
the international press explode with articles critical of France, but
there were also demonstrations against France in many countries, including Italy, Belgium, Great Britain, and the United States.24 One of
the Frances that was torn in two by “l’affaire” suffered, while the
other celebrated Dreyfus’s second conviction.25
Outside of France, however, a different, philo-French perspective also existed, which can be seen in a description given in the
recent memoir of Henri Borlant, the only survivor of six thousand
Jewish children under the age of sixteen who were deported from
France to Auschwitz in 1942.26 Henri Borlant described his father,
born in the late nineteenth century in a village near Odessa in what
today is Ukraine.27 Henri Borlant noted:
[His father’s] dream [had been] to come to France. At
the time, people used to say that a country where half
the population championed Dreyfus, an obscure Jewish officer, could only be a marvelous country where it
would be good to live, a country where a Jew could
become a captain.28
Just as it captured the imagination and indignation of many
outside of France, the case of this officer convicted of high treason
for supplying intelligence to the enemy, and sent to rot on Devil’s
Island, captivated and destabilized all of France, and in so doing, both
illuminated cracks that previously had not been apparent and deepened others that had been.29 This hold on the imagination was of a
symbolic order. The Dreyfus affair is the story of its own subtext.
21
THE ANNUAL REGISTER: A REVIEW OF PUBLIC EVENTS AT HOME AND ABROAD FOR THE
YEAR 1899, at 255 (1900).
22
Rights of Man and Citizens (1789), ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE, http://www.assembleenationale.fr/histoire/dudh/1789.asp (last visited Dec. 27, 2012).
23
See, e.g., PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: THE RISE OF MODERN PAGANISM (reissued
1995).
24
BREDIN, supra note 1, at 546.
25
Id. at 543.
26
HENRI BORLANT, MERCI D’AVOIR SURVECU 27 (2011).
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Lubet, supra note 20, at 332.
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But not just of one subtext: it is the story of numerous underlying
subtexts, one of the most important of which was the struggle to define, or to redefine, the French nation.
Dreyfus himself, swept up in the arcane mechanisms of penal
machinery, was focused single-mindedly on reclaiming his innocence
and honor.30 In his reticence about other issues, those other issues,
such as political matters, questions of the Enlightenment and human
rights, floated on a symbolic plane. They were palimpsests underlying the two trials, or, seen another way, open spaces, in which the
public became personally invested and engaged. Consequently, one
can understand the sense of some who felt that Alfred Dreyfus did
not measure up to the Dreyfus affair. On the other hand, to whose affair did he not measure up? It was their own, rather than his.
Reproaches have often been leveled against Dreyfus that he
did not speak out in his own defense, and that he appeared emotionless throughout the Rennes trial.31 A review of the transcript of the
trial compels the opposite conclusion. Dreyfus spoke at length, and
always confidently and with impressive specificity and precision, reconstituting events, showing how and why his accusers could not be
telling the truth.32 By now he, too, had been obliged to recognize that
his accusers were guilty of fabrications and inventions, and not just of
errors. On numerous occasions throughout the trial, he broke out in
protest against the injustice and inaccuracy of testimony and, as he
put it, its calumnious nature.33
Dreyfus’s own abstention from entering into the struggle to
define his nation came from the unshakeable faith in France that this
brilliant man and soldier bore, and that he was to fight for again in
the First World War.34 Charles de Gaulle would say of himself in his
memoirs that he always had had “a certain idea of France.”35 Of
Dreyfus, one can say that he had “an idea certain” of France admitting no doubts. Dreyfus remained a man of exemplary honor and in30

ALFRED DREYFUS & L.G. MOREAU, THE LETTERS OF CAPTAIN DREYFUS TO HIS WIFE 112
(1900).
31
See BREDIN, supra note 1, at 405-07 (describing the trial generally and the impression
made by Dreyfus specifically, on others, some of whom were in attendance).
32
See LE PROCÉS DREYFUS, supra note 7, vol. 1, at 22-45, 654-56, vol. 2, at 231-32, 23435, (detailed letter by Dreyfus read into court), 459, 490, 526, 549.
33
E.g., BREDIN, supra note 1, at 525.
34
Id. at 619.
35
CHARLES DE GAULLE, MEMOIRES DE GUERRE - L’APPEL (1940-1942) 7 (Plon, 1954)
(Pocket 2007).
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tegrity throughout his ordeal, and the extraordinary suffering he underwent did not seem to make him bitter.36 Along with Jean-Denis
Bredin, I am prepared to consider Dreyfus a hero, and certainly to
submit that he fully measured up to l’affaire that bears his name.37
By the time the Rennes trial took place, proof of his innocence abounded.38 In addition to the evidence noted earlier,39 Colonel Picquart offered impeccable testimony.40 Picquart had discovered
Dreyfus’s innocence by chance when, as a faithful army man, he had
believed in the captain’s guilt because Picquart’s superiors had announced Dreyfus’s guilt as a certainty.41 Picquart, who never had had
the slightest motivation or inclination to favor Dreyfus, and who personally had brought the infamous secret file about Dreyfus to the military judges during the first trial, offered testimony of Dreyfus’s total
innocence, and of acts on the army’s part to obtain Dreyfus’s conviction and to hide the truth by dint of conspiracy, lying, and forgery.42
His testimony was particularly convincing thanks to its high degree
of thoroughness.
The so-called graphology, or handwriting expert, who still
maintained that Dreyfus’s handwriting was the same as that on the
treasonous note, the borderie, did his best to testify in an ultratechnical manner, but instead sounded tendentious.43 Another expert
demolished his testimony swiftly, and with unconcealed contempt
and indignation.44 The essential fact remained that the complete
identity between the writing of the real traitor, Esterhazy, and that of
the borderie did not require any expertise: it was apparent to the
naked eye.
In France, there is no quantitative standard in criminal law for
the defendant’s conviction.45 Whereas in the United States, the stan36

ALFRED DREYFUS, SOUVENIRS ET CORRESPONDANCE PUBLIES PAR SON FILS (1936).
BREDIN, supra note 1, at 692.
38
Id. at 224-25.
39
Supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
40
LE PROCÉS DREYFUS, supra note 7, at 368-73, 480-82.
41
See BREDIN, supra note 1, at 151-52 (discussing how Picquart came to realize the
handwriting was indicative of Dreyfus’s innocence).
42
WILLIAM HARDING, DREYFUS: THE PRISONER OF DEVIL’S ISLAND 162-72 (n.p. Associated Publ’g Co. 1899).
43
LE PROCÉS DREYFUS, supra note 7, vol. 2, at 218-21, 318-86.
44
Id. at 475-85.
45
See CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PÉN.] art. 427 (Fr.); Christoph Engel, Preponderance of the Evidence Versus Intimate Conviction: A Behavioral Perspective on a Conflict
Between American and Continental European Law, 33 VT. L. REV. 435, 435 (2009).
37
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dard for conviction is “beyond a reasonable doubt,”46 in France the
standard is that of the judge’s “intimate conviction.”47 The process
preceding the trial, known as the instruction, or investigation period,
functions as a filtering mechanism, such that if the instruction leads
to a trial, the judge in charge of the instruction believes there is a
strong probability that the defendant committed the crime.48 Thus,
unsurprisingly, an overwhelmingly high percentage of criminal trials
in France result in a conviction.49
At Rennes, the predisposition of the presiding judge of the
Council of War was discernible from the start.50 He refused to acknowledge Dreyfus’s military rank, even though the order of the
Court of Cassation to refer Dreyfus’s case for remand51 had automatically reinstated Dreyfus to his military rank of captain.52 The presiding judge would address Dreyfus brutally: “Stand, accused one!” and
other forms of abruptness from which it would not have been difficult
to form an idea of Presiding Judge Jouaust’s “intimate conviction”53
concerning Dreyfus’s guilt even before the beginning of the proceedings.54 It was only in the final hearing that the presiding judge would
acknowledge Dreyfus’s rank by referring to him, finally, as “Captain
Dreyfus.”55 Against all likelihood, Presiding Judge Jouaust, who had
treated Dreyfus roughly and disrespectfully throughout the trial, was
persuaded to credit the defense, and was one of the two votes in favor
of acquittal.56 That act of courage caused him to lose his career,
however, as the army retired him on January 28, 1900, close on the
46

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
Supra note 45 and accompanying text.
48
CHRISTIAN DADOMO & SUSAN FARRAN, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 192 (1993).
49
See BELL, supra note 17, at 112 (noting that the acquittal rate for crimes in France was
4.6% as of 1998). See generally JACQUELINE HODGSON, FRENCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A
COMPARATIVE ACCOUNT OF THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIME IN FRANCE
(2005) (discussing the French criminal law system).
50
NICHOLAS HALASZ, CAPTAIN DREYFUS: THE STORY OF A MASS HYSTERIA 222 (1955)
(“The browbeating attitude of the court’s president, Colonel Jouaust, to Dreyfus and his attorneys contrasted grossly with the deference he showed General Mercier and the witnesses
for the prosecution.”).
51
See BREDIN, supra note 1, at 405-06 (discussing the harsh nature of questioning of
Dreyfus by Colonel Jouaust).
52
See id. at 404 (describing Dreyfus appearing in court in his army uniform).
53
See supra note 45 and accompanying text (on the French standard for criminal conviction).
54
LE PROCÉS DE DREYFUS, supra note 7, vol. 1, at 2, 21, vol. 2, at 484.
55
Id. vol. 2, at 484.
56
BREDIN, supra note 1, at 428.
47
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heels of the trial.57
The trial proceedings did not stay within the limits of relevant
issues, as several witnesses were interested in testifying only about
concerns that touched them personally. For instance, Casimir-Pèrier,
who had been President of France at the time of Dreyfus’s arrest,
seemed either unaware of or unconcerned about the stakes the trial
involved for Dreyfus, and seemed interested, only principally, in
drawing the court’s attention to alleged errors that had been published
recently in a newspaper.58 According to Casimir-Pèrier, an article
had appeared which portrayed him as having made a promise to
Dreyfus that he never had made.59 With apparent lack of awareness
of his own pompousness, he declared himself to be insisting on the
incident, not out of any selfish motivation, but only because his numerous former illustrious positions on behalf of France required as
much for the national good:
It is not the private citizen that is upset [about my situation]; [but] for the honor of the position of judge that
I had, for the honor of the Republic, I shall not permit
it to be said that he who was President of the Republic
and commander in chief of the army so much as exchanged words with a captain accused of treason.60
The transcript indicates that the audience applauded upon hearing
this.61 Instead of cutting him off, the presiding judge let him speak
57

Id. at 543.
See LE PROCÉS DE DREYFUS, supra note 7, vol. 1, at 64.
59
Id. at 60-66.
60
Id. at 66.
61
Id. In France, there were no official, detailed trial transcripts, due to historical reasons
dating from the time of the French Revolution of keeping open courts. See HOWARD G.
BROWN, ENDING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: VIOLENCE, JUSTICE, AND REPRESSION FROM THE
TERROR TO NAPOLEAN 76, 97 (2006) (discussing how historically, trials were left open to the
public and relied heavily on oral testimony rather than trial transcripts). However, private
newspapers soon after the Revolution were permitted to send their own stenographers. The
resulting trial transcripts, composed for newspaper readers, tend to incorporate the reactions
of the public at every moment in the trial, including, especially, boos, hisses, applause,
cheers, ironic laughter, etc. The revolutionaries had introduced into French law what became the “principle of orality” (“le principe de l’oralité”) to end the pre-Revolutionary hidden, written orders that could doom a person without a fair trial. Initially this meant no recording of proceedings. Orality was supposed also to avoid problems for the many who
could not read or write. Within six months, newspapers had received permission to send
private stenographers to trials of public interest, and they gave a livelier account of all that
transpired in the courtroom than the United States stenographers’ transcripts, which are limited to the words of the witness. It was only with a twenty-first century scandal (l’affaire
58
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his piece.
Is the army’s perfidy the only explanation of the trial’s outcome? What other explanations might there be for Dreyfus’s second
conviction and for the zeal of the anti-Dreyfus groups? How can we
understand, if at all, the lies and deceptions of the army? It made a
mistake when it mistook Dreyfus’s handwriting for the one in the
bordereau, which it resembled somewhat,62 but then it became engulfed in a Machiavellian conspiracy to make the world believe the
initial error. 63
The temptation to lie can prove difficult to resist. The pressure on prosecutors occasionally can contribute to their allowing or
presenting false testimony.64
Anti-Semitism played an important, perhaps even overwhelming, role in the temptation to lie, but there also were other causes.
For instance, the French army had been humiliated by the military defeat of 1870 and the great suffering that had followed.65 In the context of its own past failures, it is likely the army did not want to betray its failings and mistakes, and especially not have them be
displayed in public.
For its part, the country expected from its army eventual revenge against Germany, and it needed the army to protect it from attack. Some of those in the anti-Dreyfus part of the population sought
to support the army at any price so that it would be as powerful as
possible and feared weakening it through a public trial of its ineptitude. This motive came from a double, although perhaps related, origin. In the first part, France felt, and was, vulnerable, and the antiDreyfusards were hoping through their blind support to situate the
army as well as possible to protect the country from external attack.
d’Outreau) that reforms in French criminal procedure created a duty to record all proceedings. See Evelyne Serverin & Sylvie Bruxelles, Restituer l’oral dans la procédure pénale, in
Enregistrements, procès-verbaux, transcriptions devant la Commission d’enquête: le traitement de l’oral en questions, 55 DROIT ET CULTURES 149-80 (2008).
62
Guieu, supra note 1.
63
Id.
64
See Shaila Dewan, Duke Prosecutor Jailed; Students Seek Settlement, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 8, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/08/us/08duke.html?ref=michaelbnifong
(describing how prosecutors in the United States sometimes also have become committed to
hiding the truth, as in the case of the Duke University lacrosse players falsely accused of
rape, where a number of innocent young men came close to spending a good part of their
lives behind bars because of an unscrupulous prosecutor).
65
ROGER L. WILLIAMS, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1870-1871, at 2-3 (Jack P. Greene
ed., W.W. Norton & Co. Inc. 1969) (1969).
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In the second part, as Michel Drouin has suggested, a large part of
France’s population, like Dreyfus himself, held the army in the greatest admiration, if not in idealization or near-idolatry.66 To them,
doubting the word of the army seemed unpatriotic.
Was France’s military justice system less reliable than its civil
counterpart? Excepting the hearing behind closed doors, even that is
not so clear. It is more than possible that the military judges who
voted to convict Dreyfus may have followed the wishes of the army
rather than their “intimate conviction” with respect to the defendant’s
guilt. The failure to comply with required criminal procedure in the
first trial in the affair of the secret file certainly constituted a violation
of the law. On the other hand, the role procedure plays is less important in countries of civilian (in this context, Continental European,
codified) law like France than in common-law countries like the
United States.
While the distinctions between the two systems in this regard
are beyond the scope of this essay, it may be said summarily that
United States law imposes rigid limitations on what may be presented
during trials and that procedure is inextricably linked to the idea of
fair play, to such an extent that procedural fairness is a matter of constitutional law.67 In France, substantive truth, and the search for the
truth, takes primacy.68 Therefore, the idea that the court may have
obtained access to evidence through irregular means, in violation of
what procedural law had in mind, is less shocking to the French legal
spirit than its American counterpart, at least if the information is of
assistance in the universal objective of understanding the truth. This
was still truer in the nineteenth century than today.
Thus, Colonel Picquart who would be ready to sacrifice his
career and liberty for Dreyfus, a man he barely knew, had not hesitated to transmit the secret file to the judges in the first military trial
as long as he did not suspect his army colleagues of having fabricated
evidence against an innocent man.69 Similarly, an attempt to insert a
secret file into the closed hearing at the Rennes trial did not succeed,
but nevertheless was not evaluated as being a particularly serious vi66
Michel Drouin, Political and Religious Forces (author’s notes from Drouin lecture at
Touro Dreyfus conference).
67
E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
68
Martin A. Rogoff, A Comparison of Constitutionalism In France and the United States,
49 ME. L. REV. 21, 53 (1997).
69
BREDIN, supra note 1, at 155 (discussing the low priority of procedural requirements to
the French sense of justice).
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olation in the eyes of the tribunal.
When one considers the conduct of the Court of Cassation,
namely, of non-military justice, it also must be conceded that the reason Dreyfus had to wait many years for his vindication was that the
Court of Cassation obeyed another master, namely the government.70
In both institutions, military as well as civilian, there were also some
exceptional individuals prepared to fight for the truth at any cost.
In ending this essay, I would like to disclose my own Dreyfus
affair, the subtext that I read between the lines of this riveting story.
It is that society’s institutions, whether juridical or not, depend on
those individuals, those human beings, who inhabit them, who people
them. Therein lies society’s Achilles’ heel, but also no doubt its
hope.

70

Id. at 595 (showing that even after the innumerable tergiversations that caused Dreyfus
to have to wait until 1905, he was to have to wait yet a bit longer for the Court of Cassation
to render its judgment of vindication, because, as Bredin puts it, everyone thought it better to
wait for the general elections to be over beforehand).
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